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 The Closing Gates of Democracy:
 Frontier Anxiety
 Before the Official End of the Frontier
 David M. Wrobel
 Frederick Jackson Turner's contribution to the study of American history is
 perhaps unparalleled. His 1893 address, "The Significance of the Frontier in
 American History," is probably the best-known work of American historical
 analysis. But Turner's reputation has clouded historical perceptions. There have
 been some excellent studies of the historical climate in which Turner conceived
 his essay, but these studies have, by their nature, reconstructed that climate only
 as it related to Turner.1 Thus, pre-1893 expressions of concern over the closing
 frontier have been examined with an eye to their role in shaping Turner's thesis.
 Similarly, frontier-related concerns voiced after the appearance of Turner' s essay
 are generally assumed to have been inspired by his thesis. The magnitude of the
 Turner phenomenon has obscured the significance of a widespread frontier
 anxiety pervading the last decades of the nineteenth century. Focusing rigidly on
 Turner, historians have debated at great lengths the finer points of his intellectual
 odyssey, the precursors of his frontier thesis, and its originality.
 This study does not question the originality of Turner's thesis - that the
 frontier molded the nation's character. No attempt is made to belittle Turner by
 raising the laurels of others at his expense.2 Turner provided the most scholarly
 and memorable expression of frontier anxiety. His masterful synthesis of the
 American past renders whimsical any questioning of his originality. Ideas do not
 spring to mind fully formed, and Turner would certainly not have claimed this of
 his frontier thesis.3 Instead, it is suggested here that Turner's writings were
 symptomatic of a widespread frontier anxiety that emerged in embryonic form in
 the 1870s, and became more pronounced in the succeeding decade. At the same
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 time, this is not an examination of Turner's precursors. In fact, Turner warrants
 only a brief mention for his pre-1890 thoughts on the closing of the frontier.
 The primary purpose of this analysis is to highlight some of the tensions of
 the 1880s as they related to anxiety over the closing of the frontier.4 The focus
 is not on intellectual anxiety for its own sake, but rather that this concern seems
 to have influenced and helped shape the period under study. If the 1880s are
 viewed as a calm before the storm of the tumultuous nineties, an examination of
 frontier anxiety in those years suggests it was an uneasy calm at best5 When we
 consider that many Americans had, from the earliest years of their country's
 history, viewed it as an agrarian paradise, a Garden of Eden far removed from the
 evils of the Old World, it comes as no great surprise that the realization of the
 disappearing frontier of free land provoked a response from American thinkers.
 Contact with America's virgin soil, according to American tradition, meant
 release not just from poverty and oppression, but also from the immoral European
 mentality that bred these vices. But, by the 1870s, it was becoming staikly
 apparent, at least to a handful of intellectuals, that the continued existence of an
 American Eden was in peril.
 Although there has been no major study of frontier anxiety in the late-
 nineteenth century, what historical consensus exists suggests it was almost
 exclusively a phenomenon of the 1890s. Perhaps because of the scholarly
 emphasis on Turner, or the historical assessment of the 1890s as a watershed, the
 historical field of vision has been too narrow.6 Intellectual concern over the
 closing of the frontier did not appear suddenly in 1890 when the superintendent
 of the Eleventh Census declared that there was no longer an unbroken frontier
 line.7 The Census Bureau announcement of 1890 has frequently been mentioned
 because it is a convenient device for historians who feel that frontier anxiety
 warrants a mention, but not an investigation, in their accounts of the late-
 nineteenth century. It has also been used by those trying to account for the factors
 that influenced Turner's essay. But the Census of 1890 gave fresh impetus to
 ongoing concerns. In fact, the census report of 1880, as will be seen, also played
 a very significant role in the genesis of frontier anxiety.
 As early as the 1870s, observers were expressing their concern that much of
 the country's land had been settled or bartered away to railroad corporations and
 foreign syndicates. By the 1880s, a significant number of intellectuals began to
 question the nation's stability. Some began to respond to the gloomy state of
 affairs by seeking legislation to stem the tide of immigration. Worried by the
 threat of European-style overcrowding, they argued that America's changing
 status rendered her incapable of housing and transforming the world's unfortu-
 nates. In the same vein, and under the same rallying cry of "America for
 Americans," attempts were made to restrict and even eradicate alien landholding
 in the United States and her territories. The seemingly alarming growth of farm
 tenancy in the eighties heightened the anxiety further. Some intellectuals even
 proposed annexation, or at least union, with Canada to compensate for the
 apparent exhaustion of America's public lands. It seems reasonable to suggest
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 that these "frontier anxieties" helped shape a minor crisis as the 1880s unfolded,
 and formed a noteworthy prelude to the temperament of the anxious nineties. Any
 examination of frontier anxiety ought to begin with this formative period.
 I
 The frontier of free or cheap land was, from the earliest years of the nation's
 history, seen by many as the wellspring of American democracy. An almost
 mystical faith in the country's written constitution was linked to a belief that the
 frontier facilitated the continued existence and growth of democracy. Such
 notions concerning the link between America's democratic mode of government
 and her abundant resources were not new in the late-nineteenth century. There
 would have been no frontier anxiety in that period had there been no substantial
 agrarian heritage. The image of the New World as an agrarian utopia peopled by
 sturdy yeoman farmers was a strong and enduring one.8 But it was also apparent
 to some writers that America could not remain in a state of arcadian bliss
 indefinitely. Linking their country's good fortune to its abundance of land, many
 American observers had contemplated a crisis in the distant future.9 And a good
 number of European intellectuals, too, forecast more turbulent times for the New
 World when the cheap lands ran out and the "safety valve" shut down.10 The
 intellectual anxiety that emerged in the 1870s and developed into a significant
 force during the 1880s was an expression of concern over America's future in the
 light of a changing situation. When the public lands became perceivably
 exhaustible, the problem was addressed with newfound urgency.
 Less than a decade after the enactment of the Homestead Act - the intended
 capstone of the nation's agrarian heritage - a young social critic pointed to great
 troubles in Eden.11 Henry George had been quarreling with Horace Greeley's
 famed advice to the downtrodden since the late 1860s.12 In 1871 George wrote
 a crushing indictment of public land policy. His pamphlet, "Our Land and Land
 Policy," went too far against the grain of popular assumptions to have much
 impact at that early date but did lay down the fundamental points of his most
 famous work, Progress and Poverty, which would set the tone for the frontier
 anxiety of the ensuing decades. George adopted a Malthusian approach to
 population growth, reckoning on a 24 percent increase each decade. He weighed
 these findings against the remaining 450 million tillable acres of unsettled public
 land, and concluded that within a generation people would "look with astonish-
 ment at the recklessness with which the public domain has been squandered."13
 George also offered a case study of land policy in California. He attacked land
 monopoly in such a new state. A potential paradise for yeoman farmers tending
 medium-sized farms, California's public lands, he said, had already passed into
 the hands of an exploitative class of landlords. George worried that the imminent
 polarization of classes resulting from this situation, not just in California, but all
 over the country, would eventually bring democracy to its knees. His words
 reached few ears at this early time. But George was not alone in expressing
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 concern in the 1870s over the abuses of public land policy and the exhaustion of
 the public domain.
 In 1875, the Prussian-born journalist Charles Nordhoff viewed the frontier's
 recession as a "serious calamity to our country." "Cheap and fertile lands," he
 said, "have acted as an important safety-valve for the enterprises and discontent
 of our non-capitalist population." Nordhoff claimed that the eagerness with
 which American statesmen pursued the acquisition of new territory, "has arisen
 from their conviction that this opening for the independence of laboring men was
 essential to the security of our fiiture as a free and peaceful state." Perhaps only
 one in every thousand poor laborers took advantage of the public domain, he
 concluded, but "it is plain that the knowledge that any one may do so makes those
 who do not more contented with their lot, which they thus feel to be one of choice
 and not of compulsion." Nordhoff felt that with these lands fully settled, America
 could not escape experiencing the pains that afflicted Europe.14
 In the same year Brevet Major General William B. Hazen, in a pamphlet
 entitled "Our Barren Lands," declared that the region between the Missouri River
 and the Sierra Nevada mountains, and stretching from the Rio Grande to the
 Canadian Border, was not worth "a penny an acre." Hazen's article was just one
 episode in a virulent war of words with George Armstrong Custer, who ridiculed
 notions of Western aridity.15 In a longer and less polemical article that appeared
 in the North American Review in the same month, Hazen declared that the country
 "was rapidly approaching the time when the landless and the homeless" would no
 longer be able to "acquire both lands and homes merely by settling them." Hazen
 had dropped a bombshell on the nation's confidence in the West. He argued that
 "the formation and rapid growth of new, rich, and populous states" would no
 longer "be seen in the present domain." Uncle Sam, he announced, was no longer
 rich enough "to give us all a farm . . . unless we take farms incapable of
 cultivation."16
 Even more influential was John Wesley Powell's government-sponsored
 "Report on the Lands of the Arid Regions of the United States," which surfaced
 in a very limited edition in 1878 and then in a larger press run the following year.17
 Powell, the director of the United States Geographical and Geological Survey of
 the Rocky Mountain Region, had been expressing concern over the future of
 white settlement in the lands of the semi-arid West as early as 1873. Like Hazen,
 Powell had argued that the area between the Rockies and the Sierras lay under
 threat of constant drought. His explorations of the region in 1873, delivered in
 a report to the Secretary of the Interior the following year, had stated the
 "immediate and pressing importance" of "a general survey ... for the purpose of
 determining the special areas which can ... be redeemed by irrigation."18 Little
 attention was paid to Powell's warnings until the emergence of his "Report on the
 Lands of the Arid Regions
 arid regions of the West could not be cultivated by yeoman farmers working
 medium-sized holdings. The remaining lands had to be properly classified and
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 changes brought to bear on public land policy to prevent prospective homestead-
 ers from meeting with disaster.
 Powell had swept aside hopeful fantasies about the West, offering hard
 realities in their place. His report helped spark a land-reform movement and
 convinced the Federal Government to take action. In 1879 a Public Land
 Commission was created for the purpose of apportioning the remaining lands in
 a more rational manner. Despite Powell's warnings, his realities proved too hard
 to swallow. Traditional assumptions held firm, and the land acts of the late 1 870s
 continued to apply the old homestead principle to the semi-arid lands of the West.
 Worse still, settlers poured into this region, taken in by the popular myth that rain
 followed the plow.19 This ill-founded optimism was not dispelled until 1887,
 when the prolonged period of drought that Powell had predicted set in.
 II
 To at least a handful of observers before 1 880 then, it seemed that the frontier
 was becoming less of a democratizing force in American life, and that tenancy and
 landlordism were fastening themselves on the New World, as they had in Europe.
 But these expressions of anxiety did little to dampen the confident national mood
 of the immediate post-Reconstruction years. The great "undeveloped" West was
 still reckoned to be the nation's trump card, and agrarian mythology was still
 confidently believed. But, from 1880 on, there was much worried commentary
 on the state of the public domain.
 Although the censuses of 1860 and 1870 had indicated the presence of a
 number of large landholdings in the prairie states, it was not until 1880 that the
 full picture started to become clear. By that time the newly formed Public Land
 Commission had performed the monumental task of codifying all congressional
 legislation relating to the public lands.20 Thomas Donaldson, one of the five
 members of the Commission (along with Powell), completed his massive official
 history, The Public Domain, in 1880.21 More importantly, the statistics on
 tenancy had been gathered. The 1880 census revealed those statistics, and
 suggested that tenant farming, even in relatively new states like Kansas and
 Nebraska, had gained a foothold.22 The 1 880 Report was also the first to provide
 data on farm mortgages and the size of landholdings. Furthermore, it contained
 a series of maps showing the extent of the uninhabited area of the United States
 and its territories for every census year since 1790. Each map showed the density
 of population in different regions, and indicated the point that the "frontier-line"
 had reached.23 Those who consulted the Census could gauge that the United
 States had more tenant farmers than any European country, that many farms were
 too heavily mortgaged to be profitable, that large estates were becoming more
 common, and that there was no longer an extensive frontier of free land that might
 serve to reverse the process.24
 The appearance of Henry George's Progress and Poverty that same year
 brought that message home to more people.25 George attributed nearly every
 aspect of the national character to the abundance of unfenced land. 'This public
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 domain," he said, "has been the transmuting force which has turned the thriftless,
 unambitious European peasant into the self-reliant Western farmer; it has given
 a consciousness of freedom even to the dweller in crowded cities and has been a
 well-spring of hope even to those who have never thought of taking refuge on it."
 George, like Nordhoff, stressed that for every American, "there has been the
 consciousness that the public domain lay behind him," adding that the knowledge
 of this fact had given Americans a sense of "generosity . . . independence,
 elasticity and ambition." Cheap land, he said, made America's institutions
 superior to those of other countries. But George's message was an ominous one.
 He stated that the republic had entered on a new era in which land monopoly was
 becoming the norm. Commenting on California, he stated that it would be
 "difficult to point the immigrant to any part of the state where he can take up a farm
 on which he can settle and maintain a family."26
 George allowed the American people no great credit for their democratic
 achievements, believing that any nation possessing an "enormous common"
 would have accomplished as much. But with the great pool of public land
 seemingly close to drying up, comparisons of conditions in America and Europe
 would no longer continue to be so favorable to the former. In the same month that
 Progress and Poverty was published in New York, the Atlantic Monthly featured
 another pessimistic study that compared the effects of farm tenancy in England
 and America. The growth of the tenant farming system in America was seen as
 "an evil of the greatest magnitude." At least in England the rents were low and
 the land "thoroughly cultivated and improved." But in America, where rents were
 high and tenancy impoverished the land, there was "not one redeeming feature in
 the whole system."27
 The ominous forebodings of 1880 were repeated and elaborated on as the
 decade unfolded. Efforts were made to locate the actual position of the receding
 frontier line.28 The story of the rapid settlement of the West and the noble
 character of the pioneers was often recounted.29 The "Garden of Eden," in its
 ostensible state of deterioration in the 1880s, was receiving as much attention as
 the prospering West had in any earlier decade. And the new question of concern
 that emerged was how to alleviate certain ills now that the frontier was seemingly
 less capable of performing that function.
 Ill
 Henry George followed up on the success of Progress and Poverty with the
 publication of his second major work, The Irish Land Question, in early 188 1.30
 He described the full extent and the terrible consequences of landlordism in
 Ireland. The attack, however, was directed as much against the American land
 system as the Irish one. Surely, he said, America, "with millions of virgin acres
 yet to settle," ought to be in a position to advise the British. But George claimed
 that such times had passed by. America could not counsel other countries because
 her states were witnessing "the growth of a system of cultivation worse in its
 social effects than that which prevails in Ireland."31 His conclusion, that private
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 property in land was the root cause of the ills that existed in Britain and America,
 went too far against the grain of America's agrarian mythology not to cause a
 great stir. Very few writers reacted complacently to George's ideas. But if many
 Americans argued with his solutions, few who read his work could have been
 unaffected by his vivid accounts of the specific problems arising from land
 monopoly, and his constant reminders that free or cheap land was a rapidly
 diminishing commodity.
 Thomas Donaldson, writing in the North American Review in August 1881,
 stated that the supply of lands suitable for homesteading was "practically
 exhausted in the West." At this early date Donaldson, unlike George, was not
 overly alarmed by the tendency toward monopolization. He felt the taxation
 powers of state legislatures were great enough to break down extensive holdings
 and thus provide more land for homesteading.32 An editorial in Century Magazine
 in late 1882 expressed, without qualification, an even more optimistic opinion.
 The author urged young Easterners to go West and take advantage of the "career
 openings" in the sturdy yeoman farmer profession.33 However, from 1883, when
 the findings of the last census were officially published, hopeful evaluations of
 the West became a rarer occurrence among experts on the public lands.34 An
 influential article in the February 1883 edition of Century Magazine on "The
 Evils of Our Public Land Policy," by the economist Edward T. Peters, was
 indicative of the rising concern. Peters pointed to an alarming growth in the
 number of large farms. He calculated that between 1 870 and 1 880 the number of
 farms of more than 1 ,000 acres had risen from 3,720 to 28,578, a more than seven-
 fold increase. Though the system of large farming could be economical, any
 advantages reaped from it were "only to be had," he said, "by permitting gigantic
 monopolies of the soil, under which the lion's share of all the benefits ... fall into
 the hands of a few persons." Peters noted the abuses and failings of the existing
 land policies, which made the public lands "the easy prey of the monopolist," and
 concluded that with America fast becoming as densely peopled as any other
 country, it might be appropriate to fix the ominous motto, "After us the deluge,"
 to the nation's public land policy.35
 The year 1883 also saw the publication of William Goodwin Moody's
 vicious attack on land monopoly, Land and Labor in the United States. Moody,
 an embittered social reformer, despairingly noted the transformation of the
 American farmer since the Civil War, from proud landowner to poor tenant. He
 recounted the process by which the farmer's lands became heavily mortgaged,
 then fell into the hands of railroads and bankers, then were reunited as bonanza
 farms on which the former owner would work as a seasonal tenant. Moody saw
 the central elements of the agrarian myth - unoccupied land and the yeoman
 farmer - fast disappearing from the American scene, and declared that his
 country "had taken immense strides" to place itself "in the position in which
 Europe is found after a thousand years of feudal snobbery."36
 The typical American farmer, cultivating his own medium-sized property
 and developing aspects of an independent and "manly character," Henry George
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 lamented in 1884, was "the product of conditions under which labor is dear and
 land is cheap." As these conditions disappeared, the yeoman farmer would "pass
 away as he had passed away in England." Reserving to actual settlers what little
 arable land there was left, as the Land Commission proposed in 1884, was, in
 George's opinion, "merely a locking of the stable door after the horse has already
 been stolen."37 The Land Commission, however, had at least alerted the
 government to the theft. In a long supplementary section in the 1884 edition of
 The Public Domain, Donaldson made the alarming, albeit erroneous claim that
 only five million acres of "purely agricultural lands" remained in public owner-
 ship in the West, and then proceeded to attack Congress for allowing the
 monopolization of the public lands.38
 In 1885, the North American Review commissioned a special reporter,
 Thomas P. Gill, to investigate the problems of tenancy and landlordism. The
 report, which surfaced in January 1886, emphasized that America had more
 tenant farmers than England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales combined. The claim,
 whether numerically true or not, was a misleading one, but one designed to strike
 an emotive chord in the American psyche. Gill compared America's great
 landlords to the absolute monarchs of past times. He saw the small proprietor
 becoming a"tenant-at-will," little better off than a serf.39 In the following month's
 edition the North American Review featured another article on the same topic.
 Utilizing the findings of the 1880 Census, its author, Adam J. Desmond, pointed
 to the presence of more than one million tenant farmers in the United States.
 Desmond commented that this was "two hundred thousand more than Ireland had
 in the palmiest days of landlordism" - again, a striking, though misleading and
 inaccurate comparison , but one that struck quite a blow at the Myth of the Garden.
 Desmond's figures on tenancy were lower than Gill's, but his related comments
 were more revealing. After noting the favorable land-to-man ratio that America
 had possessed and squandered away to railroad corporations, Desmond voiced a
 widespread concern in claiming that the main beneficiaries of the subsequent sale
 of railroad lands were alien landlords.40
 Alien landlordism had been a source of vehement public outcry in the prairie
 and plains states all through the 1870s. The most notorious alien landlord, the
 Irishman William Scully, had come to symbolize for Westerners the evils of land
 monopoly. "Landlordism" and "Scullyism," along with "anti-Scullyism" and
 "anti-alien land ownership," had become synonymous terms in the West before
 the major national magazines picked up on the issue in the eighties. Lists of alien
 holdings and recent acquisitions were widely published in Western newspapers
 to document the full extent of the danger.41 The threat posed by these new
 developments appeared to be very real as land became a more precious commod-
 ity. The issue played a part in the 1884 presidential campaign as both parties
 called for restrictions on alien landholding in their platforms. The sustained
 outcry led to the passage of federal legislation in 1887, and soon after, action by
 certain states restricting alien landholding.42
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 Anxiety over the disappearing frontier had intensified opposition to all
 abuses of the public land laws and helped shape government policy in that area.
 Federal efforts to restore to the public domain the hundreds of millions of acres
 that had been fraudulently gained began in earnest during Grover Cleveland's
 first administration. The next Democratic Party platform demanded the forfeiture
 of 100 million acres, or approximately half of the land granted to Western railroad
 corporations. And in 1885 bonanza farming received a direct blow when an
 executive order mandated the removal of all fences.43 In 1887 the Dawes
 Severalty Act secured millions of acres of Indian reservation lands for white
 settlement44 And, two years later, on April 22, 1889, when the extensive lands
 of the Five Civilized Tribes were opened, thousands of land-hungry homestead-
 ers poured into the region at the crack of a starter's gun. It was apparent that
 anxiety over the closing frontier was not confined to the nation's intellectuals.45
 IV
 American Indians were not the only victims of anxiety over the perceived
 closing of the frontier. The cry of "America for Americans," directed at the
 opulent alien landholder in the 1870s and more virulently in the 1880s, was also
 levelled against the destitute foreign immigrant. Immigration reached unprec-
 edented numbers in the eighties. Worse still to many, it consisted of ostensibly
 inferior elements from Southern and Eastern Europe. The influx of the "new
 immigration" seemed to coincide with the growth of urban squalor, political
 corruption and industrial discontent, and anxious observers had no trouble
 establishing a causal link. Much of this anti-immigrant feeling stemmed from
 racist assumptions that had surfaced more fully in the Social-Darwinist frame-
 work of the late-nineteenth century.46 The historic traditions of American
 nativism - dormant since the fifties - re-emerged in the eighties to restrict the
 spread of the three ominous European "r's" - radicals, religion and races. Some
 anti-immigration agitators often merely utilized the factor of the closing frontier
 to augment their arguments. But at the same time, it was not difficult to see a link
 between the diminishing opportunities for escape to the West and the onset of
 urban problems. As early as 1 88 1 a New York Tribune article stated that the nation
 had "reached the point in its growth where its policy should be to reserve its
 heritage for coming generations, not to donate it to all the strangers we can induce
 to come among us."47 Thomas Donaldson, too, suggested that the immigrant who
 could possess land immediately upon declaring his intentions of becoming a
 citizen had an unfair advantage over those who had been born and had lived in the
 United States for twenty-one years, and who had no prior right to the land.48
 Donaldson elaborated on his position in the 1884 edition of The Public Domain.
 Pointing to the arrival of nearly 800,000 new immigrants in 1882, and in light of
 his findings on the state of the public domain, Donaldson declared the inexpedi-
 ency of proclaiming "to all nations of the earth that whoever shall arrive in this
 country from a foreign shore, and declare his intention to become a citizen, shall
 receive a farm of 160 acres
 57
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 Many intellectuals believed in the assimilative power of free land, the
 melting pot being strongly linked to the nation's agrarian heritage. If given
 yeoman status, the shiftless immigrant would transform both his social position
 and his character. As Henry George put it, the "virtue of new soil" was that it
 created "wholesome human growth" from "degraded and dangerous materials."
 He saw the North American continent as the world's last great frontier. It was,
 for George, "that expansion over virgin soil" that gave freedom to American life
 and "relieved social pressure in the most progressive European nations." Accord-
 ing to George, the closing of America's frontier would have calamitous effects on
 both sides of the Atlantic.50
 In 1885 the evangelical missionary, Josiah Strong, claimed that the day was
 close at hand when the public land would be exhausted and immigrants would
 pour into the cities.51 Strong had stated the correlation rather crudely (the city had
 been the immigrant's abode for decades), but his perspective was not uncommon.
 With the assimilative capacity of the New World apparently declining, the
 continued acceptance of Europe's immigrants seemed an open invitation to
 Europeanization. Thomas Gill viewed the problem in especially dramatic
 fashion. Seeing that America was seeking no conquests to add to her domain, he
 wondered how she could continue to invite the "overflow population of the world
 to take possession of her territory . . . giving to everyone the privilege of
 citizenship, that allows even aliens to possess her soil." If America continued on
 this reckless course, Gill added, it would suffer the same consequences that
 followed the mistakes of Ancient Rome.52
 The Norwegian- American Hgalmar Hjorth Boyeson, a professor at Colum-
 bia College and a recognized authority on immigration, shared the outlook
 common among those of his adopted country. Boyeson blamed the changing
 social conditions on the continuing flow of immigration. He said that Americans
 were beginning to feel crowded "in spite of the magnificent dimensions of the
 continent." "Our cities are filling up," he went on, "with a turbulent foreign
 proletariat, clamoring for *panem et circenses' as in the days of Ancient
 Rome. . . ."53 Boyeson felt that the existence of the republic was threatened
 because the new immigrants were no longer being absorbed. With reduced
 opportunities in the New World, the new immigrant no longer had any respect for
 America's political institutions. And, not being animated by the American
 democratic spirit, the new immigrant would be even less assimilable. Boyeson
 had postulated a vicious circle of ills, which he reckoned could be broken only by
 anti-immigration legislation.
 By the latter part of the decade these expressions of concern had taken their
 toll. The legislative action, begun in 1887 at both the federal and state levels, and
 aimed chiefly at non-resident landlords, also limited both the employment and
 landholding opportunities open to the less-affluent immigrant.54 Frontier anxiety
 was certainly not the only factor that helped alter perceptions on the question of
 the continued utilization of America's resources by Europe's underclass. More-
 over, some argued against restrictions on the grounds that American institutions
 58
This content downloaded from 129.15.66.170 on Tue, 21 Jun 2016 18:54:45 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 were holding up and could still speedily assimilate Europe's "poor apologies for
 mankind."55 In fact, when it came to actually restricting immigration, the
 naysayers would hold sway until the beginning of the 1920s. But the seeds of
 discontent, apparent as early as the 1870s, had taken root in the 1880s, and would
 bear ominous fruit in 1894, when the national Immigration Restriction League
 was formed. Meanwhile, in the same period, another factor was beginning to
 enter the equation. With less cheap land on the one hand, and increasing land
 monopoly and steady immigration on the other, a few intellectuals considered
 increasing the public domain to offset the imbalance.
 V
 Concern over the closing of the frontier in the eighties did not have the effect
 on American foreign policy that it had on public land policy. There is little
 evidence to suggest, as one notable historian did, that from the 1870s the closing
 of the frontier convinced agricultural elements to push the country towards a more
 active foreign policy in their search for overseas markets.56 Other than Josiah
 Strong's prophetic announcement that "the pressure of population on the means
 of subsistence" in America would lead the Anglo Saxon race on a heightened
 course of overseas expansion, frontier related expansionist designs in the eighties
 were almost invariably directed toward Canada.57
 The Nation and the North American Review in the early eighties featured a
 number of articles on the feasibility of annexing Canada, but until 1884 little
 mention was made ofthat country's vast resources in connection with America's
 diminishing land supply. When calls for annexation did begin to appear on those
 grounds, they came from both Americans and Canadians. Prominent figures in
 Canada's Liberal Party often proposed closer relations with the United States as
 a solution for the lethargy of their own economy. They were usually well-to-do
 capitalists who felt American trade and investment were crucial to the expansion
 of Canadian business and industry. Their entrepreneurial designs were being
 stifled by the ruling Conservative Party, which was favorable to British policy and
 shunned relations with the United States. The Liberals proposed everything from
 Canadian-American reciprocity treaties to outright annexation by America.
 When their more moderate proposals made little headway, they succumbed to the
 supposed inevitability of Canada's drifting into America's orbit58
 What is significant was the Liberals' utilization of a "frontier argument" to
 entice the United States into taking action, and the frequency with which
 American periodicals published the argument. In 1884 the North American
 Review featured a quite blatantly annexationist article by the Canadian physician
 and historian, Prosper Bender. Bender talked at length about Canada' s "immense
 tracts of virgin soil" and the "splendid opportunities that would be afforded to
 ... the hard-pressed toilers of Eastern factories, mines, and foundries, as well as
 the cultivators of sterile and worn out lands, by the rich, virgin territory of the
 North West." He reminded the reader that "the available first-class land awaiting
 settlement in the Republic is of no great extent," and that it would all be taken up
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 in the near future. Bender wondered how there could be any opposition in
 America to simply "going up and possessing the land." He concluded that the
 constant stream of European immigrants could then be directed up into Quebec
 and Ontario, thus relieving the build-up of social pressure in America's cities.59
 By the middle of the decade a number of American journals, particularly
 Forum, The Nation, and the North American Review, were featuring articles that
 pointed to the imminence of Continental Union with Canada.60 Great attention
 was focused on elections in Canada, the hope being that the Liberal Party would
 come out on top and establish reciprocity treaties with the United States.
 American political theorists assumed that Canadians would then see the benefits
 of better relations and press for a closer union. As it turned out, most Americans
 remained indifferent to these proposals, and most Canadians were hostile to them.
 But proposals for annexation continued to appear, and the closing American
 frontier was usually an integral element in the arguments.61
 Erastus Wiman, a prominent Canadian capitalist, was the driving force
 behind the Liberals' United States-oriented policies. His articles regularly
 appeared in the North American Review in the late 1880s. Wiman continually
 wavered between the advocacy of Continental Union and outright annexation by
 the United States, but always stressed the vastness of Canada's resources, which
 he said would serve to offset "the strange sense of limitation" being felt in the
 United States, where there was "no more new territory left to occupy." Like
 Bender, he suggested the possibility of America's offloading its immigration
 problem onto Canada. He reckoned on a steady course from commercial union
 to political union, which, when established, would immediately take the pressure
 off American soil. A few months later, in June 1889, Wiman was considerably
 less of a gradualist. He suggested that if the fishing disputes then going on
 between the two countries led to outright hostility, the United States would be
 justified in taking Canada by military force. Wiman hoped that Canada might free
 herself from all ties to Great Britain, and then willingly divide itself into perhaps
 thirty states. If not, he felt that the United States shouldperform the task. By 1890
 he was asking in plain terms "has not the time for the Capture of Canada come?"62
 Few of those who addressed the Canadian situation at the end of the decade
 wrote so boldly as Wiman. The more common question was not "when shall we
 annex Canada?" but "Is Union With Canada Desirable?" And those who stressed
 the desirability of Union rarely failed to mention Canada's extensive wheatfields,
 timber and mineral resources.63 America, of course, never came close to a
 Continental Union with Canada. Even reciprocity treaties were hard to come by
 in the late-nineteenth century. Nevertheless, it is worth considering the intense
 interest with which American journals viewed Canadian affairs, and the fre-
 quency with which some Americans and Canadians proposed the utilization of
 Canada' s abundance to offset America' s diminishing returns. The frustration that
 some Americans experienced at the disappearance of these possibilities might
 certainly be viewed as a prelude to the expansionist temper of the nineties.
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 VI
 Meanwhile, as anxiety over the closing of the frontier helped to shape
 concerns in specific areas like public-land policy, immigration control and the
 nation's position vis-a-vis new territorial acquisitions, an increasing number of
 writers and intellectuals started to reflect on the disappearance of the old frontier
 West. Frontier anxiety had entered the general cultural milieu of the 1880s. At
 the start of the decade a young Frederic Remington came upon the realization that
 "the wild riders and the vacant land were about to vanish forever." And, as he later
 recalled the moment, Remington began "to try and recall some of the facts" about
 him, and "saw the living, breathing end of three centuries of smoke and dust and
 sweat." By 1881 Remington was chronicling in his art the closing moments of
 a more heroic age marked by a special breed of "men with the bark on."64 Owen
 Wister journeyed out West a few years after his future friend and co-worker
 Remington, displaying a supreme optimism about the region's future. But
 Wister's vision was marred by a fear, as he recorded in 1885, "that the prairies
 would slowly make way for your Cheyennes, Chicagos, and ultimately inland
 New Yorks, everything reduced to the same flat ... level of utilitarian
 civilization
 Nye, in an article entitled "No More Frontier," lamented that the march of
 civilization had taken all the joy out of pioneer life. Nye remarked that the Old
 West was so far gone that a single day's ride could get a man to where he could
 see daily papers and read them by electric light.66
 There were good grounds for making such assumptions about the passing of
 the Wild WesL Indeed, by the early 1 880s William F. Cody was turning that saga
 into a highly lucrative entertainment spectacle. On July 4th, 1882, Buffalo Bill
 Cody performed his first Wild West Show, advertised as the "Old Glory
 Blowout," outside of North Platte, Nebraska. By the middle of the decade the
 famous Sioux leader Sitting Bull had become a featured performer, though he
 would end his days in a more fitting fashion just prior to the real Wild West battle
 ofWounded Knee in December 1890. But three and a half years before Wounded
 Knee, in May 1887, the New World came face to face with the Old as the Wild
 West Show played in London to Prime Minister Gladstone, the Prince of Wales
 and Queen Victoria herself- as symbolic an end to the Wild West as Sitting
 Bull's last stand. A flood of Buffalo Bill novels began to appear in that year. And,
 by 1889, Cody's first imitator, Dr. W. F. Carver, a celebrated marksman, was
 touring Europe with twenty-five "performing Indians" hired from reservations.
 What was ominous food for thought for many intellectuals had become good
 business.67
 But as the image of the cowboy was being deified for profit, the people of
 western Kansas were streaming back east at the end of the decade with "In God
 we trusted, in Kansas we busted" chalked on their wagons. The agrarian myth was
 beginning to crumble even as the cowboy acquired mythic status. The noble
 pioneer was fast becoming a rootless vagrant. Hamlin Garland had returned West
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 in 1887 only to see its romance fading away. The yeoman farmer, as Garland later
 recalled in his autobiographical work, A Son of the Middle Border (1917), was
 toiling incessantly for no reward and could no longer be consoled by his supposed
 separation from a more advanced, more corrupt civilization. All that was left, in
 Edgar Watson Howe's estimation, was the bitterly futile agrarian existence that
 he had portrayed in his first book, The Story of a Country Town ( 1 883). That same
 year Mark Twain completed his Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (1884), ac-
 knowledging the end of the frontier as Huck naively pondered the possibility of
 lighting out for the Territory ahead of the rest. Twain's comic style was a far cry
 from the darker broodings of Garland and Howe, but his black humor was as
 surely a part of the literary realism that emerged in the 1880s to throw a cynical
 light on the agrarian myth.68
 Meanwhile, Helen Hunt Jackson was taking a cynical view of the Westward
 march of white settlement Her Century of Dishonor (1884) chronicled the
 crushing of Indian resistance that had characterized the Wild West, and she
 aroused sympathy for a dying culture in her novel Ramona (1885). Theodore
 Roosevelt was less concerned with the fate of the Indian, but reflected sadly on
 the rapid disappearance of the "old race of Rocky Mountain hunters and trappers,
 of reckless, dauntless Indian fighters," and formed the Boone and Crockett Club
 in late 1887 to preserve a little of the old frontier spirit69 Century Magazine
 provided a running commentary on the vanishing West in the last years of the
 decade. Roosevelt's "Frontier Types" series appeared from May to October,
 1 888, and was followed by two more six-issue series, "Pictures of the West," and
 "Pictures of the Far West," all of which were more concerned with preserving the
 last fragments of pioneer culture than with telling the reader about any great
 "unknown West."70
 As the decade came to a close, two European observers (both of whom are
 generally cited as important precursors of Turner), the English Lord James Bryce,
 and the Italian economist Achille Loria, reflected on the problems they forsaw for
 the United States as a frontierless democracy. Loria, who had viewed free land
 as a factor in the development of political institutions since the 1870s, remarked
 in 1 889 that 'The cessation of economic freedom, because of the total occupation
 of the soil, is destroying democratic methods, the glory of American times."71
 Bryce was hardly less pessimistic, commenting that the hardy, venturesome, self-
 reliant Western pioneer type was fast disappearing from the scene as the West
 filled up. He stated that this region provided a "safety valve" for Eastern
 discontents, but was losing its effectiveness. As the frontier closed, "pauperism
 . . . would become more widespread, wages would drop, and work would be
 harder to find; the chronic problems of old societies and crowded countries, such
 as we see them today in Europe, will have reappeared on this new soil
 be a time of trial for economic institutions."72
 Also in 1 889, in The Winning of the West, Roosevelt commented on the harsh
 heroic lives of the Western pioneers "who have shared in this fast-vanishing
 frontier life."73 Ayounghistoria^FrederickJacksonTume^reviewedRoosevelt's
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 work that same year, pointing to the West as a fruitful field for historical study.
 But Turner would not play a role in the development of frontier anxiety for a few
 years yet74 In fact, before the census report of 1890 marked the official end of
 the frontier and prompted Turner to formulate his frontier thesis, frontier anxiety
 had helped shape the temper of the 1880s. That anxiety would become more acute
 in the nineties, but its earlier development was a factor of no small significance.
 That development, though interesting in a historiographical context for its
 bearing on Turner's intellectual Odyssey, seems deserving of attention in its own
 right, in a more strictly historical context.
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